Tres perspectivas en materia de justicia: Calicles, el mito de Protágoras y la noble mentira socrática
Fecha
2016-06-27
Autores
Montoya Correa, María Del Pilar
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Universidad EAFIT
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La reflexión política de Platón, así como la teoría de la justicia que de ella se desprende, escapan de las categorías convencionales que definen las tendencias políticas de la Atenas del siglo V a. C. La imposibilidad de circunscribirlas en el marco de dichas categorías nos enfrenta a una dificultad mayor en relación con la comprensión de la aserción según la cual la justicia es una realidad natural. Al afirmar lo anterior, el filósofo pone en relación de complementariedad dos realidades que, de acuerdo con la mentalidad política de la Grecia antigua, representan los polos opuestos de la antinomia entre la ley positiva y el llamado derecho natural o νόμος κατὰ φύσιν. Por muy paradójico que parezca, el hecho de considerar que la justicia es una realidad natural confiere su orientación y su lógica propia al proyecto político desarrollado en la República platónica. Conforme a dicha orientación, Platón logra instalar un mito fenicio como base de su proyecto político y materializar las lecciones que se desprenden del mismo bajo la forma de una serie de prescripciones destinadas a encaminar la existencia de los miembros de la ciudad ideal en la dirección fijada por la justicia natural.
Plato’s political conception, as well as the theory of justice that emerges from it, forgo conventional categories which define the dominant political theories in fifth century Athens. The impossibility to circumscribe them within these theories impedes the comprehension of Plato’s assertion according to which justice is a natural reality. By asserting it, the philosopher draws a parallel between two realities which, according to ancient Greek thinking, constitute two opposite poles in the antinomy between positive law and what is known natural law or νόμος κατὰ φύσιν. As paradoxical as it may seem, considering justice as a natural reality confers to the political project developed in the Republic its own logic and orientation. According to this orientation, Plato is able to use a Phoenician myth as a foundation to his political project and to materialize the lessons that emerge from it under the form of a series of prescriptions, whose objective is to lead the existence of the City members on the path set by natural justice.
Plato’s political conception, as well as the theory of justice that emerges from it, forgo conventional categories which define the dominant political theories in fifth century Athens. The impossibility to circumscribe them within these theories impedes the comprehension of Plato’s assertion according to which justice is a natural reality. By asserting it, the philosopher draws a parallel between two realities which, according to ancient Greek thinking, constitute two opposite poles in the antinomy between positive law and what is known natural law or νόμος κατὰ φύσιν. As paradoxical as it may seem, considering justice as a natural reality confers to the political project developed in the Republic its own logic and orientation. According to this orientation, Plato is able to use a Phoenician myth as a foundation to his political project and to materialize the lessons that emerge from it under the form of a series of prescriptions, whose objective is to lead the existence of the City members on the path set by natural justice.