Examinando por Autor "Jetter, Michael"
Mostrando 1 - 17 de 17
Resultados por página
Opciones de ordenación
Ítem Corruption: Transcending borders(Universidad EAFIT, 2014-01-27) Alemán Correa, Esteban; Jetter, Michael; Dávila, Jimena; Montoya Agudelo, Alejandra; Morales, DanielaIs corruption capable of spreading across national borders? This paper uses panel data for 120 countries from 1995 to 2012 to evaluate whether the corruption levels ofneighboring countries, as weighted by the relative joint border length, affects domestic corruption. Including country fixed effects allows us to control for unobservablecountry specifc aspects and our results suggest a positive and statistically signifcant relationship. In general, a ten point increase in the weighted freedom from corruption index of neighboring countries is associated with a one point increase of the domestic freedom from corruption index. This result is robust to a variety of alternative specifcations, such as a GMM estimation or including additional control variables. The proposed effect becomes stronger as income increases and the relationship is only positive for countries with a GDP per capita above US$1,600 (in 2000 US$). For the richest countries, the estimated coe cient rises up to 0:43.Ítem The Determinants of UN Interventions. Are There Regional Preferences?(Universidad EAFIT, 2013-04-14) Duque, Juan C.; Jetter, Michael; Sosa, SantiagoWhat leads the United Nations Security Council to intervene in one conflict, but remain inactive in others of similar magnitude and cruelty? This paper analyzes all registered 178 internal and internationalized internal conflicts since 1945, with the goal to unveil what determines the probability of a UN intervention. Our main focus lies on the question whether the geographical proximity to the ve permanent members of the UN Security Council (China,France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has an e ect on the probability of intervention. Our results suggest that the UN is substantially more likely to intervene in conflicts located in Europe. A more detailed look at distances revels that for every 1,000 kilometers of distance from France or the United Kingdom the probability of intervention decreases by about one third. Further, we nd that UN intervention is signi cantly more likely to happen in smaller (less population), poorer (smaller GDP per capita), and less open economies (openness to international trade).Ítem Does urbanization mean bigger governments?(Universidad EAFIT, 2013-04-14) Jetter, Michael; Parmeter, Christopher FThis paper proposes urbanization as a determinant of government size. As people move to cities, their demand for a more de ned set of regulations, but also for basic health, education, and income standards rises. Our theoretical framework determines how the regional distribution of the population a ects government size. We test this theory on panel data of 175 countries from 1960 to 2010 and two state-level samples from Colombia and Germany. Results demonstrate a strong positive e ect from urbanization on government spending, with a 1 percent increase in the amount of urban citizens leading to a 0.2 percent rise in public expenditure. Our ndings indicate that public sectors may become more important as worldwide urbanization is progressing. This result underlines why government e ectiveness and the quality of public goods provision will be even more important in the future.Ítem The Effect of Democracy on Corruption: Income is Key(Elsevier, 2015-06) Jetter, Michael; Montoya Agudelo,Alejandra; Ramírez Hassan Andrés; University of Western Australia and IZA (Bonn), Crawley, Australia; Universidad Eafit,Escuela de Economía y Finanzas, Medellín, Antioquia, Colombia; Universidad Eafit,Escuela de Economía y Finanzas, Medellín, Antioquia, Colombia; Escuela de Economía y Finanzas; Economía; Estudios en Economía y EmpresaThis paper provides an explanation for the ambiguous relationship between democracy and corruption. Using rich panel data with annual observations from 1998 to 2012 allows us to control not only for country- and time-invariant factors but also for potentialreverse causality between corruption and income levels in a 3SLS framework. Democracy reduces corruption but only in economies that have already crossed a GDP/capita level of approximately US$2,000 (in 2005 US$). For poorer nations, democratization is suggested to increase corruption. Other institutional characteristics are unlikely to drive this result and findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks and quantile regressions.Ítem The effects of wage volatility on growth(Elsevier, 2013-09) Jetter, Michael; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy Alex; Smithc William T.; School of Economics and Finance, Universidad EAFIT; Department of Economics, Lehigh University; Department of Economics, University of Memphis.; Escuela de Economía y Finanzas; Economía; Estudios en Economía y EmpresaThis paper shows that the volatility of wages has significant effects on a country’s rate of economic growth. Our theoretical framework suggests two distinct channels in which wage volatility affects growth: a positive direct way and a negative indirect way. The direct effect stems from precautionary savings, whereas the indirect effect works through the mediating role of government size. In the empirical part, we use a 3SLS approach to analyze a panel of 20 high-income OECD countries and find strong evidence for the existence of both effects. These results carry general and specific implications. In general, ignoring indirect effects operating through government size may mask the real net effects of volatility on growth, which could result in misleading conclusions. Specific to wage volatility, our results suggest that the net effect on economic growth depends on both government size and the wage premium from working in the private sector. Within our sample, we find evidence for both – countries for which wage volatility is beneficial to growth and others for which it is detrimental.Ítem Game, set, and match: Do women and men perform differently in competitive situations?(Universidad EAFIT, 2015-03-17) Jetter, Michael; Walker, Jay K.; mjetter7@gmail.com; jwalker@niagara.eduThis paper analyzes potential gender differences in competitive environments using a sample of over 100,000 professional tennis matches. Focusing on two phenomena of the labor and sports economics literature, we find robust evidence for (i) the hot-hand effect (an additional win in the most recent ten matches raises the likelihood of winning by 3.1 to 3.3 percent) and (ii) the clutch-player effect, as top players are excelling in Grand Slam tournaments, the most important events. Overall, we find virtually no gender differences for the hot-hand effect and only minor distinctions for the clutch-player effect.Ítem The Gender Pay Gap Beyond Human Capital: Heterogeneity in Noncognitive Skills and in Labor Market Tastes(University of Wisconsin, 2011) Grove, Wayne A; Hussey, Andrew; Jetter, Michael; LeMoyne College; University of Memphis; Universidad EAFIT.; Escuela de Economía y Finanzas; Economía; Estudios en Economía y EmpresaFocused on human capital, economists typically explain about half of the gender earnings gap. For a national sample of MBAs, we account for 82 percent of the gap by incorporating noncognitive skills (for example, confidence and assertiveness) and preferences regarding family, career, and jobs. Those two sources of gender heterogeneity account for a quarter of the “explained” pay gap, with half due to human capital variables and the other quarter due to hours worked and current job characteristics. Female MBAs appear to pay a penalty for “good citizen” behavior (choosing jobs that contribute to society) and characteristics (higher ethical standards).Ítem Good girl, bad boy: Corrupt behavior in professional tennis(Universidad EAFIT, 2015-01-31) Jetter, Michael; Walker, Jay K.; mjetter7@gmail.com; jwalker@niagara.eduThis paper identifies matches on the male and female professional tennis tours in which one player faces a high payoff from being “on the bubble” of direct entry into one of the lucrative Grand Slam tournaments, while their opposition does not. Analyzing over 378,000 matches provides strong evidence for corrupt behavior on the men’s tour, as bubble players are substantially more likely to beat better ranked opponents when a win is desperately needed. However, we find no such evidence on the women’s tour. These results prevail throughout a series of extensions and robustness checks, highlighting gender differences regarding corrupt and unethical behavior, but also concerning collusion. We especially find evidence for collusion once monetary incentives are further increased. Finally, the market for sports betting does not seem to be aware of this phenomenon, suggesting a market imperfection and further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities in men’s tennis.Ítem Isolating causality between gender and corruption: An IV approach(Universidad EAFIT, 2016-03-09) Correa Martínez, Wendy; Jetter, Michael; wcorrea@eafit.edu.coWe address the persistent reverse causality problem in estimating the causal effect of female labor force participation (FLFP) on corruption. Employing plow usage as an instrumental variable, an increase in FLFP by one standard deviation is suggested to improve the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, ranging from zero to ten) by 0.52 points. This effect is stronger than a one standard deviation change of education levels, government size, or ethnic fractionalization.Ítem Monetary Policy Shifts and the Forward Discount Puzzle(Universidad EAFIT, 2013-04-14) Jetter, Michael; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, AlexThis paper argues that considerable switches in monetary policy are able to explain a major part of the forward discount puzzle. We build a theoretical model suggesting that violations of the uncovered interest rate parity are owed to shifts in monetary policy from a destabilizing (when the Taylor principle is violated) to a stabilizing regime (when a central bank follows a Taylor-type rule). Following the switch is an \adjustment period" during which forecasters gradually update their expectations, eventually restoring the parity. It is in this adjustment period, when the forward discount puzzle arises. In the second part of the paper we test the model on the Canadian dollar, German mark, and British pound, all against the US dollar. Results indicate that the forward discount puzzle loses signi cance after allowing for an adjustment period of about 1 { 2 years. Our results are robust to various di erent speci cations, such as the use of di erent maturities or base currencies. Further, it seems unlikely that our results coincide with contemporaneous events.Ítem Racism and judicial corruption in the US(Universidad EAFIT, 2016-02-01) Jetter, Michael; Mesa-Osorio, Alejandro; amesaos@eafit.edu.coIs racial hate reflected in the degree of judicial corruption? Using US state-level data, we find racial hate to be a positive and statistically powerful predictor of judicial corruption. This relationship prevails after the inclusion of the conventional control variables and regional fixed effects. In terms of magnitude, one standard deviation increase of racial hate relates to an increase of 70 percent of one standard deviation in corruption. Interestingly, no such relationship can be found for corruption in the executive or legislative branch.Ítem The roots of export diversification(Universidad EAFIT, 2013-01-22) Jetter, Michael; Ramírez Hassan, AndrésCountries with diversi ed export baskets take advantage of various bene ts, which are said to foster and stabilize economic growth directly and through indirect channels (e.g. reduced income volatility, positive externalities, spillover e ects). This is especially important in the context of developing economies. However, identifying the true determinants of export diversifi cation is di cult as there exists no comprehensive theoretical or empirical framework to capture all potential factors in their entirety. This paper uses Bayesian Model Averaging to uncover the true long-term roots of export diversi cation among 43 potential determinants,and thus 2 potential models. Our results suggest that only four factors are important in predicting export diversi cation levels over the long run: natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP (100 % posterior inclusion probability), primary school enrollment rates (96 %), population size (25 %), and foreign direct investment levels (17 %). Many prominent candidates turn out to be insigni cant in determining diversi cation levels. Neither policy-related variables (e.g. tari s, freedom from trade regulations or democracy) nor macroeconomic factors (such as trade openness, terms of trade or domestic investment levels) nor geographical remoteness (whether the country is an island or landlocked) play a role. Various robustness checks con rm our results.Ítem The superstar quest: Does youth talent predict professional success for female and male tennis players?(Universidad EAFIT, 2014-04-14) Jetter, Michael; Grove, Wayne A.We estimate the relationship between international youth and professional tennis rankings. We find no difference between the predictiveness of rankings from age 14 & Under versus age 16 & Under competitions. The most persistent predictor of professional success is beating older top ranked juniors. Our results reveal stark gender differences. For example, ordinal junior rankings are more strongly associated with professional success for males than for females. In addition, future tennis stars are better signaled by U14 competition outcomes for females, but by U16 results for males.Ítem Trade openness and bigger governments: The role of country size revisited(Elsevier, 2015-03) Jetter, Michael; Parmeterb, Christopher F.; Universidad EAFIT, Medellín, Colombia; Department of Economics, University of Miami, United States; Escuela de Economía y Finanzas; Economía; Estudios en Economía y EmpresaThis paper revisits the question of why more open countries tend to have bigger governments. We replicate successfully the main results of Ram (2009), who rejects the role of country size as an omitted variable. However, several extensions advise against a hasty conclusion: The results differ substantially depending on the data source used, the timeframe considered, the countries selected, and the way variables are measured. Specifically, we employ newer versions of the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1 and 8.0), allowing us to both extend the number of observations and the timeframe. We find evidence for the claim that smaller countries do indeed have bigger governments, especially when using the PWT 8.0 data, and Ram (2009) findings might be driven by the specific dataset used (PWT 6.1) and the countries included in that sample. Finally, we also conduct quantile regression analyses to pin down at which point of the distribution the suggested relationships come out.Ítem UN interventions: The role of geography(SPRINGER, 2015-03-01) Duque, Juan C.; Jetter, Michael; Sosa, Santiago; Universidad EAFIT. Departamento de Economía y Finanzas; Research in Spatial Economics (RISE)This paper argues that UN military interventions are geographically biased. For every 1,000 kilometers of distance from the three permanent Western UNSC members (France, UK, US), the probability of a UN military intervention decreases by 4 percent. We are able to rule out several alternative explanations for the distance finding, such as differences by continent, colonial origin, bilateral trade relationships, foreign aid flows, political regime forms, or the characteristics of the Cold War. We do not observe this geographical bias for non-military interventions, providing evidence that practical considerations could be important factors for UNSC decisions to intervene militarily. In fact, UNSC interventions are also more likely in smaller and poorer countries - both of which are indications of less costly interventions and higher chances of success, everything else equal.Ítem Volatility and Growth: An Explanation for the Disagreement(Universidad EAFIT, 2013-06-26) Jetter, MichaelThis paper reconsiders the e_ects of volatile growth rates on growth itself. I show that the underlying endogeneity of government size can hide the net growth e_ects from volatility. There exists a positive direct and a negative indirect channel, with the latter operating through the size of the public sector. Risk-averse citizens respond to volatility either with precautionary savings (direct e_ect) or by demanding a stronger public safety net, which in turn lowers growth (indirect e_ect). However, the indirect channel is only available if the political regime allows citizens to determine their desired level of public services. I test this theory on a balanced panel of 95 countries from 1960 { 2010. The paper reveals the latent endogeneity of government size in a single growth equation framework and o_ers a simultaneous estimation method as an alternative. Results support the existence of both effects. The direct channel is stronger in autocratic societies, but as a country turns to democracy the indirect channel dominates. Volatility has a positive net e_ect on growth in autocratic nations, but a negative net effect in democratic societies. This finding explains why previous growth analyses of volatility at times reached contradicting conclusions.Ítem Volatility and growth: Governments are key(Elsevier, 2014-12) Jetter, Michael; Department of Economics, School of Economics and Finance, Universidad EAFIT, Carrera 49 7 Sur-50, Avenida Las Vegas, Medellín, Colombia, IZA, Bonn, Germany; Escuela de Economía y Finanzas; Economía; Estudios en Economía y EmpresaThere exists a persistent disagreement in the literature over the effect of business cycles on economic growth. This paper offers a solution to this disagreement, suggesting that volatility carries not only a positive direct effect, but also a negative indirect effect, operating through the insurance mechanism of government size. Theoretically, the net growth effect of volatility is then ambiguous. The paper reveals the underlying endogeneity of government size in a balanced panel of 90 countries from 1961 to 2010. In practice, the negative indirect channel dominates in democracies, but with less power to choose public services in autocratic regimes the positive direct effect takes over. Consequently, volatile growth rates are detrimental to growth in democracies, but beneficial to growth in autocracies. The empirical results suggest that a one standard deviation increase of volatility lowers growth by up to 0.52 percentage points in a democracy, but raises growth by 1.66 percentage points in a total autocracy. These findings point to a crucial intermediating role of governments in the relationship between volatility and growth. Both the size of the public sector and the regime form assume key roles