2021-03-042014-06-100929821525391208WOS;000338993600006http://hdl.handle.net/10784/26221Throughout the preparatory analysis of human existence (Dasein), Heidegger holds the firm conviction of the moral neutrality of the phenomenological interpretation. However, in determining the temporal sense of care (Sorge) as the being of Dasein, Heidegger seems as if he did not resist the pressure of the reader anymore and was forced to admit that, in the transition from the first to the second section of Being and time, an ideal of existence, a particular form of humanism was made manifest and claim their rights. The purpose of this article is to show a possible way to explain this problematic continuity among fundamental ontology, morality and humanism, showing how the finitude of Dasein, determines a necessary link among these levels of interpretation of the human life.spaUniversidad EAFIT - Departamento de HumanidadesarticleOntologyownednessmoralhumanismethicsexistenceDasein2021-03-04G. VELEZ LOPEZ