Aledo Martínez, Juana2018-12-172018https://hdl.handle.net/10784/13377In this End of Mater Project, we analyse the most relevant empirical and theoretical papers and main ideas behind them -- Following academic work made us understand what is the role of accounting information in the improvement of debt contracting and how it achieved this, among different mechanisms -- Here we are focusing our attention on two different theories, The Agency theory and The Incomplete contract theory -- We consider really important the differences between two of them and how they, together, influence contract making -- Furthermore, we base our analysis on different type of covenants included in both theories, as well as on the impact of accounting conservatism to risk reduction or at least risk perception -- Finally, we explain importance of existence of renegotiation process both, ex-post and ex-ante -- All this in order to understand how debt covenants are made, why lenders rely on them and why in different case scenarios they play completely different roleapplication/pdfengInformación financieraTeoría de la agenciaTeoría de los contratos incompletosConservadurismoContratos de deudainfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCONTRATOSContractsAcceso abierto2018-12-17Marín Salazar, Daniel AlejandroIlić, Iva332.6 M353reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFITinstname:Universidad EAFITrepourl:https://repository.eafit.edu.cohttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2