Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría
Fecha
2017-10-31
Autores
Vilatta, Emilia
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Editor
Universidad EAFIT
Resumen
Descripción
En el presente artículo me concentraré en el estudio filosófico de los delirios, como un caso ejemplificador del vínculo que pueden establecer la filosofía de la mente y la psiquiatría. Frente a versiones radicalmente naturalistas, que proponen variantes reduccionistas o eliminativistas para la explicación de ciertos fenómenos mentales y sus variantes “anormales”, defenderé una versión moderada de la perspectiva naturalista. Al respecto, señalaré que retener algún grado de simpatía hacia el naturalismo en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre los delirios es necesario para desarrollar teorías sobre las creencias empíricamente informadas que no resulten contradictorias con los desarrollos actuales en psicología cognitiva y neurociencias. No obstante, afirmaré también que una perspectiva exclusivamente naturalista -tanto por parte de la filosofía como de la psiquiatría misma- es incapaz de dar cuenta del contexto normativo en donde juegan las creencias. Los criterios normativos, especialmente externos (sociales y pragmáticos) que se emplean para clasificar ciertas creencias como delirantes no resultan inteligibles bajo una explicación puramente natural. Por el contrario, para comprender las creencias delirantes qua delirantes, será preciso acercarnos a un abordaje híbrido que pueda contemplar las causas naturales del fenómeno así como su evaluación normativa.
This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminativist variables to explain certain mental phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspective –from both philosophy and psychiatry itself- cannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Normative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment.
This paper focuses on the philosophical study of delusions as an example of the link that can be established between the philosophy of mind and psychiatry. Against radically naturalistic versions that suggest reductionist or eliminativist variables to explain certain mental phenomena and their ‘abnormal’ variables, I will stand up for a toned-down version of the naturalistic perspective. In this sense, I will point out that it is necessary to keep some level of sympathy towards naturalism in the philosophical research on delusions to develop the theories about the empirically informed beliefs that do not contradict the current developments on cognitive psychology and neurosciences. Nevertheless, I will also state that an exclusively naturalist perspective –from both philosophy and psychiatry itself- cannot render an account of the regulatory context within which beliefs develop. Normative, particularly external, criteria (social and pragmatic) used to classify certain beliefs as delirious are not intelligible under a purely natural explanation. Conversely, to understand delusional beliefs as delusional, it will be necessary to take an interest in a hybrid approach that considers the natural causes of the phenomenon as well as its normative assessment.