Las condiciones históricas de posibilidad del General Point of View
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2017-10-31
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Universidad EAFIT
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El presente artículo ofrece una solución al problema metaético que florece en la ética humeana a propósito de la conciliación entre el cognitivismo derivado de la exigencia del General Point of View y el internalismo moral que se deriva de su argumento de la motivación. Asumiendo una descripción evolutiva en la construcción de la perspectiva evaluativa representada por el General Point of View, al tiempo que un proyectivismo epistemológico para los juicios causales que conectan las motivaciones, acciones y utilidad de los distintos caracteres que surgen en el origen de la justicia, se puede conciliar -sin riesgo para la consistencia del planteamiento humeano- la existencia de individuos capaces de generar juicios morales cognitivos que derivan en una motivación moral internalista, identificada con el sentido del deber, e individuos con motivaciones claramente externalistas basadas en el uso instrumental de la razón.
This paper offers a solution to the metaethical problem that flourishes in Hume’s ethics concerning the conciliation between the cognitivism derived from the demands of the General Point of View and the moral internalism that results from its reasoning of motivation. Through the assumption of an evolutionary description in the construction of an evaluative perspective represented by the General Point of View, and at the same time an epistemological projectivism for the causal judgments that connect motivations, actions and usefulness of the different characters that emerge from the origins of justice, it can be reconciled –with no risk against the consistency of Hume’s approach – that there is existence of individuals who are capable of creating cognitive moral judgments resulting in an internalist moral motivation, which is identified with the sense of duty, and individuals with clearly externalist motivations based on the instrumental use of reason.
This paper offers a solution to the metaethical problem that flourishes in Hume’s ethics concerning the conciliation between the cognitivism derived from the demands of the General Point of View and the moral internalism that results from its reasoning of motivation. Through the assumption of an evolutionary description in the construction of an evaluative perspective represented by the General Point of View, and at the same time an epistemological projectivism for the causal judgments that connect motivations, actions and usefulness of the different characters that emerge from the origins of justice, it can be reconciled –with no risk against the consistency of Hume’s approach – that there is existence of individuals who are capable of creating cognitive moral judgments resulting in an internalist moral motivation, which is identified with the sense of duty, and individuals with clearly externalist motivations based on the instrumental use of reason.