La solución de Wittgenstein al problema del "concepto caballo", o de cómo hablar acerca de la estructura del lenguaje según el Tractatus
Fecha
2018-08-30
Autores
Chica Pérez, Víctor Hugo
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Universidad EAFIT
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Descripción
El artículo propone interpretar la distinción que ofrece Wittgenstein en el Tractatus entre conceptos ordinarios y conceptos formales como una respuesta a las dificultades que se originan en la distinción fregeana entre concepto y objeto, a las cuales la tradición se ha referido como las dificultades del “concepto caballo”. Se mostrará que las expresiones contradictorias y paradójicas que surgen tanto del ataque a dicha distinción (v. g. “el concepto caballo es un objeto”), como de su defensa (v. g. “el concepto caballo no es un concepto”), tienen su origen en la pretensión ilegítima de describir o caracterizar la estructura lógica de la proposición usando para ello otras proposiciones. La distinción entre conceptos ordinarios y formales permite aclarar, primero, en qué sentido esas expresiones son absurdos; segundo, que la distinción entre concepto y objeto solo puede reconocerse en el simbolismo por las características de los signos, pero no puede constituir objeto de descripción.
This article asserts that the distinction made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus between ‘ordinary concepts’ and ‘formal concepts’ may be construed as a response to the difficulties arising from the Fregean distinction between concept and object, which are traditionally referred to as the ‘concept horse problem’. The paper will show that contradictory and paradoxical expressions that arise both from the attack to the Fregean distinction (e.g., the concept horse is an object) and from its defense (e.g., the concept horse is not a concept), are rooted in an illegitimate attempt, namely, to describe or characterize the logical structure of the proposition by using other propositions. The distinction between ordinary and formal concepts makes it possible to clarify, first, in what sense these expressions are nonsensical; and second, that the distinction between concept and object can only be recognized in symbolism by the characteristics of signs, but it cannot be the object of description.
This article asserts that the distinction made by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus between ‘ordinary concepts’ and ‘formal concepts’ may be construed as a response to the difficulties arising from the Fregean distinction between concept and object, which are traditionally referred to as the ‘concept horse problem’. The paper will show that contradictory and paradoxical expressions that arise both from the attack to the Fregean distinction (e.g., the concept horse is an object) and from its defense (e.g., the concept horse is not a concept), are rooted in an illegitimate attempt, namely, to describe or characterize the logical structure of the proposition by using other propositions. The distinction between ordinary and formal concepts makes it possible to clarify, first, in what sense these expressions are nonsensical; and second, that the distinction between concept and object can only be recognized in symbolism by the characteristics of signs, but it cannot be the object of description.