La interpretación de Emmanuel Levinas de Ideas I de Husserl
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2018-08-30
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Universidad EAFIT
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Este artículo describe en un primer momento la herencia que Levinas recibe de Bergson y de la fenomenología de Husserl. Luego, pone el acento en la profundidad con la que captó, desde los años 20, el significado del idealismo trascendental de la obra Ideas I (1913) de Husserl. Ello se suma a su re(con)ducción a lo trascendental, entendida como el sentido de la existencia ignorado por la ontología naturalista. La interpretación levinasiana de la controvertida “reducción” marcará tempranamente tanto sus diferencias con Heidegger como su adhesión a la fenomenología genética, especialmente a la intencionalidad horizóntica y no representativa. En ese orden de ideas, analizaremos la continuación levinasiana de esta fenomenología y su conclusión en la irreductibilidad de la responsabilidad ética.
This article starts by describing Levinas’ legacy both from Bergson and from Husserl’s phenomenology. Next, it explores how Levinas deeply understood, as early as the 1920s, the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental –understood by Levinas as the sense of existence which is overlooked by the naturalist ontology–. The Levinasian interpretation of the controversial ‘reduction’ marked, at an early stage, his differences with Heidegger and his adhesion to the genetic phenomenology, particularly to the horizontal and non-representational intentionality. Finally, the Levinasian continuation of this phenomenology as well as its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility, will be analysed.
This article starts by describing Levinas’ legacy both from Bergson and from Husserl’s phenomenology. Next, it explores how Levinas deeply understood, as early as the 1920s, the meaning of Husserl’s transcendental idealism of Ideas I (1913). He adheres to Husserl’s re(con)duction to the transcendental –understood by Levinas as the sense of existence which is overlooked by the naturalist ontology–. The Levinasian interpretation of the controversial ‘reduction’ marked, at an early stage, his differences with Heidegger and his adhesion to the genetic phenomenology, particularly to the horizontal and non-representational intentionality. Finally, the Levinasian continuation of this phenomenology as well as its conclusion, that is, the irreducibility of ethical responsibility, will be analysed.