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Accounting information and the structure of corporate debt covenants

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dc.contributor.advisorAledo Martínez, Juana
dc.contributor.authorMarín Salazar, Daniel Alejandro
dc.contributor.authorIlić, Iva
dc.coverage.spatialMedellín de: Lat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degrees Long: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degreeseng
dc.creator.emaildmarins@eafit.edu.cospa
dc.creator.emailivailic994@gmail.comspa
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-17T14:48:23Z
dc.date.available2018-12-17T14:48:23Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractIn this End of Mater Project, we analyse the most relevant empirical and theoretical papers and main ideas behind them -- Following academic work made us understand what is the role of accounting information in the improvement of debt contracting and how it achieved this, among different mechanisms -- Here we are focusing our attention on two different theories, The Agency theory and The Incomplete contract theory -- We consider really important the differences between two of them and how they, together, influence contract making -- Furthermore, we base our analysis on different type of covenants included in both theories, as well as on the impact of accounting conservatism to risk reduction or at least risk perception -- Finally, we explain importance of existence of renegotiation process both, ex-post and ex-ante -- All this in order to understand how debt covenants are made, why lenders rely on them and why in different case scenarios they play completely different rolespa
dc.description.degreelevelMaestríaspa
dc.description.degreenameMagíster en Administración Financieraspa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.ddc332.6 M353
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad EAFIT
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad EAFIT
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.eafit.edu.co
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10784/13377
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad EAFITspa
dc.publisherUniversidad Carlos III de Madridspa
dc.publisher.departmentDepartamento de Finanzasspa
dc.publisher.facultyEscuela de Economía y Finanzasspa
dc.publisher.placeMedellínspa
dc.publisher.programMaestría en Administración Financieraspa
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.localAcceso abierto
dc.subjectInformación financieraspa
dc.subjectTeoría de la agenciaspa
dc.subjectTeoría de los contratos incompletosspa
dc.subjectConservadurismospa
dc.subjectContratos de deudaspa
dc.subject.keywordContractsspa
dc.subject.lembCONTRATOSspa
dc.titleAccounting information and the structure of corporate debt covenants
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type.coarversionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.localTesis de Maestríaspa
dc.type.redcolhttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/TM
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dspace.entity.typePublication

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Maestría en Administración Financiera (tesis)