Examinando por Materia "gobierno corporativo"
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Ítem Analysis of Corporate Governance practices in the Colombia Stock Exchange(Universidad EAFIT, 31/10/2013) Diógenes Lagos Cortés; Docente Fundación Universitaria Monserrate, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Económicas. Docente Universidad Santo Tomás, Facultad de Cultura Física, Deporte y recreación. Bogotá, Colombia.Ítem Aplicación del modelo gravitacional al impacto del gobierno corporativo en las fusiones y adquisiciones en Latinoamérica(Universidad EAFIT, 2012-12-03) Vasco, Mateo; Cortés, Lina M.; Gaitán, Sandra C.; Durán, Iván A.In this study we analyze whether transnational mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are influenced by country level corporate governance standards. For this purpose, we use a gravity model. Additionally, this study focuses only on the M&As flows from the OECD countries towards Latinamerican economies, and we use the Kaufmann indicators as measures of country level corporate governance, among others. We find evidence that the gravity model is explicative of the M&As flows, and that the higher the level of corporate governance at both origin and destination countries, the greater the M&As activity.Ítem The Evolution of Interlocking Directorates Studies - A Global Trend Perspective(Universidad EAFIT, 12/12/2018) Miguel Ignacio Córdova; Pontificia Universidad Católica del PerúÍtem The weighted average cost of capital over the lifecycle of the firm: is the overinvestment problem of mature firms intensified by a higher WACC?(Universidad EAFIT, 2016-01-18) García, Carlos S; Saravia, Jimmy A; Yepes, David A; cgarci73@eafit.edu.co; jsaravia@eafit.edu.co; dyepesr@eafit.edu.coFirm lifecycle theory predicts that the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) will tend to fall over the lifecycle of the firm (Mueller, 2003, p. 80-81). However, given that previous research finds that corporate governance deteriorates as firms get older (Mueller and Yun, 1998; Saravia, 2014) there is good reason to suspect that the opposite could be the case, that is, that the WACC is higher for older firms. Since our literature review indicates that no direct tests to clarify this question have been carried out up till now, this paper aims to fill the gap by testing this prediction empirically. Our findings support the proposition that the WACC of younger firms is higher than that of mature firms. Thus, we find that the mature firm overinvestment problem is not intensified by a higher cost of capital, on the contrary, our results suggest that mature firms manage to invest in negative net present value projects even though they have access to cheaper capital. This finding sheds new light on the magnitude of the corporate governance problems found in mature firms.