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# The Determinants of UN Interventions – Are There Regional Preferences?

PRELIMINARY VERSION – NOT FOR CIRCULATION

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## Abstract

What leads the United Nations Security Council to intervene in one conflict, but remain inactive in others of similar magnitude and cruelty? This paper analyzes all registered 178 internal and internationalized internal conflicts since 1945, with the goal to unveil what determines the probability of a UN intervention. Our main focus lies on the question whether the geographical proximity to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) has an effect on the probability of intervention. Our results suggest that the UN is substantially more likely to intervene in conflicts located in Europe. A more detailed look at distances reveals that for every 1,000 kilometers of distance from France or the United Kingdom the probability of intervention decreases by about one third. Further, we find that UN intervention is significantly more likely to happen in smaller (less population), poorer (smaller GDP per capita), and less open economies (openness to international trade).

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*The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members.* Harry S. Truman

## 1 Introduction

The United Nations name as one of their four main purposes “To keep peace throughout the world.” The following pages focus particularly on the second portion of this statement – *throughout the world*. Many times one comes to wonder what determines whether the UN intervenes in one conflict, yet remains inactive in another conflict of similar magnitude and cruelty. This paper narrows down determinants of UN intervention by analyzing all registered 178 internal and internationalized internal conflicts between 1945 and 2011, with a specific focus on geographical aspects. Among these conflicts, the United Nations intervened in 27. Were we to look at a crude measurement for the severity of all 178 conflicts, we find that 93 are marked by at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. However, the pure correlation between conflict intensity and intervention is remarkably low (under 0.15). Thus, the pressing question remains as to how the United Nations Security Council makes his decision whether to intervene or not. Our main focus lies not only on finding general information regarding intervention determinants, but also on the question whether regional preferences could play any role here. Specifically, we look at the geographical distance to each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The general literature studying the determinants of third-party interventions has established various interesting claims. For instance, [Butler \(2003\)](#) concludes that “...considerations of justice may have driven U.S. decisions to employ military force in international crisis.” [Mullenbach and Matthews \(2008\)](#) on the other hand point out the difference between domestic and international factors, which might influence a U.S. decision to intervene.<sup>1</sup> In their findings, ideological linkage and geographical proximity come out as dominant forces. The latter argument will be of specific interest in the following pages. While geographical proximity may be an understandable determinant for intervention by a specific country (like the U.S.), any regional considerations should play no role whatsoever for a decision by the United Nations Security Council.

Specific to the United Nations, [Diehl et al. \(1996\)](#) examines the short- and long-term success

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<sup>1</sup>[Mullenbach \(2005\)](#) comes to similar conclusions for third-party peacekeeping missions in general.

of UN interventions, whereas [Gilligan and Sergenti \(2008\)](#) or [Smith and Smith \(2011\)](#) focus on the – sometimes unintended – consequences from UN interventions. Further, [Lebovic \(2004\)](#) focuses on the nations participating in an intervention and their democracy level. We want to be clear in mentioning that we are neither modelling the determinants of conflict nor the outcome of UN interventions.

The focus of our paper lies in the connection between two ideas prevalent in the respective literatures. First, [Neack \(1995\)](#) has hinted that states might participate in UN interventions predominantly for selfish reasons, as opposed to idealist considerations. Second, geographic proximity has been suggested as a determinant for foreign military intervention, both in general ([Pearson, 1974](#)) and in the context of the United States ([Mullenbach and Matthews, 2008](#)). We see the main contribution of this paper in finding out whether the respective conflict’s geographical distance from each of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council could play any role in determining the probability of intervention. The implied selfish reasons come as fairly intuitive: with a conflict close to domestic borders, a nation might have strong interests in containing and suppressing any sources of trouble. Not only could the conflict spill over to closer countries or even to the own country, it is also substantially more likely that the domestic nation has intensive political and economic relationships with countries in their proximity. This argument follows naturally from the gravity equation in international trade and the first law of geography that “Everything is correlated with everything else, but close things are more correlated than things that are far away.” ([Tobler, 1970](#)). Thus, countries could have a stronger interest to intervene in conflicts closer to home, rather than in conflict zones at the other end of the world. Yet regional considerations should not play any role in determining UN intervention, according to the UN charter.

However, our results suggest that the probability of UN intervention increases substantially if the conflict is located in Europe. More specifically, we find that for every 1,000 kilometers of distance from France or the United Kingdom the probability of intervention decreases by about 33 percent. This result remains remarkably stable in several robustness checks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes our sample of conflicts, whereas section 3 discusses our empirical methodology. Section 4 provides an overview of our data and section 5 presents our main results. Finally, section 6 concludes.

## 2 Conflicts

Since the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) counts 178 conflicts (excluding extrasystemic armed conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory).<sup>2</sup> The UN Security Council intervened in 27 of these in one or several of the following ways: (i) military intervention for peacebuilding, (ii) military intervention for peacekeeping, or (iii) sanctions or embargos. The UN defines a fourth method of intervention as calling for or demanding ceasing hostilities or establishment of observer mission. However, given the low commitment associated with this kind of intervention – both in financial and political terms – we decide to categorize these cases as non-intervention.

Table 1 provides a list of all 178 conflicts, indicating whether the UN did intervene – according to our above definition– or not.<sup>3</sup> A first glance at this list tells us that the overwhelming majority of conflicts in the second part of the 20th century occurred on the African and Asian continents. Even though Asian countries were subject to more conflicts (73) than African nations (65), the UN intervened substantially more in Africa – 20 times versus 3 in Asia. Finally, the UN only intervened once on an American continent, namely in Haiti around the 1990s, when “...a military faction led by Raoul Cédras managed to oust the government of popularly elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.” (UCDP website)

## 3 Methodology

Our variable of interest is whether the United Nations intervenes or not. Although one could specify the level of intervention further (e.g. financial or military commitments by the participating nations), it is difficult to disentangle and measure the exact level of involvement, especially considering the different time frames and circumstances under which these decisions have taken place. Thus, we model the UN decision as a binary outcome of intervention or not, in line with our categorization of intervention above.

We choose a logistic regression method as our econometric tool. Although there are only

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<sup>2</sup>Including extrasystemic armed conflicts between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory did not change the general implications of our results.

<sup>3</sup>Notice that there are several double entries of the same country and year, which occurs if a country incurs various conflicts within a year.



very subtle differences to a probit approach for example, we prefer the logistic model mainly because of the intuitive interpretation of the coefficients. The resulting odds ratios allow us to express the effect of a change in any independent variable on the probability of UN intervention. Specifically, our main model becomes

$$\text{logit}(p)_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Intensity}_i + \alpha_2 \text{Africa} + \alpha_3 \text{Asia} + \alpha_4 \text{Europe} + \alpha_5 X_{i,t} + \alpha_6 Z_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where  $p_i$  is the overall probability of intervention by the United Nations Security Council in conflict  $i$  (with  $i \in \{0, N\}$  for  $N$  overall conflicts). *Intensity* describes the severeness of the respective conflict, whereas continental dummies (*Africa*, *Asia*, and *Europe*) capture where the host country of the conflict is located.<sup>4</sup>

Further,  $X_{i,t}$  contains several control variables, describing the main macroeconomic and political characteristics of the respective conflict country: (i) population size, (ii) GDP per capita, (iii) openness to trade, and (iv) the Polity IV variable measuring the degree of democratization in the conflict nation. All of these are measured at the starting year of the respective conflict, indicated by the subscript  $t$ . Regarding population size, one could think of two intuitions why the UN might intervene: first, a bigger society means that the potential human loss could be greater; second, the more people you have, the more potential soldiers there are. The first argument promotes a positive relationship between population size and probability of intervention, whereas the latter argument could motivate either relationship. For instance, a negative effect could be caused by the cost of intervention increasing with more soldiers being involved.<sup>5</sup> These intuitions are also closely related to income per capita, as the opportunity cost of joining an army could naturally be lower when income is low in the first place. For a good review on the economic causes of civil war, one might consider the work of Paul Collier in general and [Collier and Hoeffler \(1998\)](#) specifically. Another reason for the importance of basic macroeconomic factors in this context is the fact that the UN may have a paternalistic view in trying to defend people that otherwise are not able to defend themselves. This philosophy is currently being

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<sup>4</sup>There have been too few conflicts in Oceania and only one intervention on the American continents, thus making the inclusion of those continental dummies obsolete.

<sup>5</sup>For a general intuition of the relationship between conflict and the size of countries, one might consult [Alesina and Spolaore \(2005\)](#).

underlined by the UN initiative “responsibility to protect” (R2P). This is reinforced by the fact that UN members have accepted the declaration of human rights and international humanitarian conventions.<sup>6</sup>

In addition,  $Z_{i,t}$  captures the geographical aspect of our analysis. First,  $Z_{i,t}$  contains basic location features, namely dummies for continents and whether the country is landlocked or an island. Further, one of the main components of our analysis is the distance of the respective conflict nation to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In theory, these geographical distances should not make any difference in the decision to intervene, yet it has often been argued (albeit mostly in newspapers and anecdotal discussions) that those decisions may carry a geographical component. We see this analysis of the geographical aspect as the main contribution of our paper – first, by the inclusion of basic continental dummies and second, more specifically, by the inclusion of the geographical proximity to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Finally,  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  constitutes the usual error term.

## 4 Data

### 4.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in our analysis. Our binary dependent variable *interv* – whether the UN intervenes in a conflict area or not – comes directly from the UN Security Council’s resolutions and is equal to one if the UN intervened according to our above categorization. The first and potentially most intuitive independent variable predicting an intervention is the intensity of the conflict (*intensity*). We would expect that as the intensity of the conflict increases, so does the probability of intervention. The UCDP allows us to categorize the severity of the conflict into “between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths” and conflicts with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths.

Further, we use the Penn World Table version 7.1 for main macroeconomic features of the countries, such as population size, GDP percapita, and openness to trade, each taken at the first

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<sup>6</sup>For a recent contribution towards the connection between regional trade agreements and conflicts, one might consider [Martin et al. \(2012\)](#).

year of the respective conflict ( $lnpop$ ,  $lngdp$ , and  $lnopen$ ). In our main specifications, we employ the natural logarithm of each of these, to achieve better comparability of results, although not using logs does not change our general conclusions.

To capture the level of democracy, we incorporate the Polity IV index ( $polityIV$ ), in particular the variable  $polity2$ , ranging from  $-10$  (totally autocratic) to  $+10$  (total democracy). Moving to the main focus of our paper, we include continental dummies and eventually the shortest distance of the respective conflict country to each of the five permanent members of the UN: the United Kingdom ( $ukdist$ ), France ( $fradist$ ), China ( $chidist$ ), Russia ( $rusdist$ ), and the United States ( $usdist$ ). In addition, we add dummies for a country being landlocked or being an island.

## 4.2 Summary Statistics of Conflicts

Table 3 displays a variety of characteristics, comparing conflicts where the UN intervened to conflicts where the UN did not intervene and to general worldwide averages. This descriptive table provides both a basic understanding of the differences between intervention and non-intervention cases (column 2 versus column 3), but also an idea of what distinguishes the host nation of a conflict from the rest of the world (columns 2 and 3 versus column 4). Starting with the latter comparison, a few features are standing out: conflict countries are (i) substantially poorer than the world average in terms of GDP per capita and (ii) less open to international trade. The fact that the group of conflict countries is both larger in terms of population (on average 85 million people, as opposed to 22.8 million as a world average) and less open to international trade is in line with previous findings. [Alesina and Wacziarg \(1998\)](#) argue that larger economies are generally less open to trade, simply because they are able to rely on a bigger domestic market.

Focusing on the conflict nations, we note some remarkable difference between cases of UN intervention and non-intervention. First, intervention is very unlikely to occur in highly populated countries, as the average country size for intervention cases is 7.2 million people, compared to 101.4 million people in non-intervention cases. This difference is astonishing. Second, mean income per capita is twice the size in non-intervention countries, suggesting that the UN is more likely to intervene in the poorest nations, with an average of only US\$ 1,850 in 2005 constant



prices (PPP adjusted). In addition, the UN appears to be more likely to intervene in less democratic (and more autocratic) nations, as suggested by the polity IV index. Finally, we notice some interesting regional differences: probability of UN intervention seems to rise in countries that happen to be further away from France (3,650 kilometers on average versus 5,050 kilometers in non-intervention cases) or located in Europe in general. Further, intervention seems to be more likely in Africa, but less likely in Asia or countries close to China. Finally, distance to the United States does not seem to make any difference.

Although these basic descriptive statistics give us some idea about the characteristics of conflicts and intervention cases, one needs to be careful not to read too much into them. The following regression analysis will provide more insight into what remains as determining factors of UN intervention.

## 5 Empirical Results

### 5.1 The Continent of Conflict

Tables 4 – 6 show our main results from logistic regressions. In all tables, we display six regressions with the odds ratio of the respective variables and the standard errors below in parentheses. The intuition of odds ratio suggests that any values bigger than 1 increase the odds of intervention, whereas a value below 1 stands for a decrease in the probability of the UN intervening. In each table, we add regressors moving from left to right, predicting the probability of UN intervention.

We first focus on the location of the respective conflicts by introducing continental dummies in table 4. Although African conflicts seem to increase the odds of intervention at first, this impression quickly fades when adding macroeconomic country features, such as population size or GDP per capita and openness to trade. Further including the Polity IV index and regional specifics in column (5) pushes the odds ratio under 1, indicating that being in Africa actually decreases the probability of intervention. However, this result is not significant. The results for Europe on the other hand are stronger. Throughout all six regressions, the European dummy is significant on conventional levels, with the odds ratio staying well above 1. This indicates that European countries have a bigger probability of UN intervention than the rest of the world.

The suggested magnitude of this effect is stunning: in our final specification with all our control variables included, intervention is 16 times more likely in European countries compared to the rest of the world.

The remaining regressors mostly confirm our initial suspicion from looking at plain summary statistics in table 3. Higher intensity of the conflict increases the probability of intervention by a factor of 7.3 in the final specification. Further, the UN is significantly less likely to intervene in (i) bigger countries, (ii) richer countries, and (iii) countries which are more open to international trade. Surprisingly, the level of democracy in the conflict country does not seem to play any decisive role for an intervention decision; neither do general geographical features such as whether the country is landlocked or an island. Finally, the coefficient on *year* is above 1 and significant, indicating that the UN was more likely to intervene in recent conflicts. Every year increases the odds of intervention by 11 percent. We find it also noteworthy to mention that a dummy variable for conflicts during the Cold War (before 1991) neither affects the significance levels nor the magnitude of our results (not displayed here, but available upon request).

In summary, these results suggest that the probability of intervention strongly increase if a conflict takes place in Europe. Note that these results do not imply a negative bias against African or Asian countries, but rather a positive bias in favor of intervention in European conflicts. However, if we look at the summary of conflicts in table 1, we note that UN intervention in Europe exclusively took place throughout the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (interventions three times in Bosnia and Herzegovina, twice in Serbia, and once in Croatia). If we were to broadly consider the Yugoslavian wars as one major conflict zone, then our results with respect to European conflicts may be driven by this one big conflict only. Thus, we now move to a more sophisticated measurement of the geography of conflicts by considering the geographical proximity of the conflict nation to each of the five permanent members in the UN Security Council.

## 5.2 The Conflict's Geographical Distance to the UN

As a more detailed measurement of geographical proximity relative to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, we now move to the inclusion of distances in kilometers. First, we consider the distance to the United Kingdom, measured in 1,000 kilometers, in table 5. Again

adding control variables from left to right, we note that the odds ratio on *ukdist* remains below 1 and statistically meaningful. This suggests that a larger geographical distance to Britain significantly decreases the probability of intervention, leaving the remaining control variables unchanged. In terms of magnitude, the final specification including all available control variables concludes that every 1,000 kilometers of distance from the UK decreases the probability of intervention by about 30 percent. Regarding the other regressors, the results are mostly in line with the ones from table 4.

Moving to another permanent member of the UN Security Council, we now consider the geographical proximity to France in table 6. We find similar results to the previous findings, as the distance to France remains significant throughout all specifications. Once again, every 1,000 kilometers of distance lowers the probability of intervention by about 30 percent. However, given the strong correlation between distances to Britain and France, these results mostly serve as a confirmation of the findings in table 5.

We now turn to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States. Table 7 replicates specifications (2) and (6) from table 6, this time including the distances from China, Russia, and the United States. However, we do not find the strong results from the previous tables, neither in terms of significance nor in magnitude: distance to either China, Russia, or the U.S. does not seem to play any role in determining the probability of UN intervention. This is specifically interesting in the context of the United States with their strong involvement in many conflict areas worldwide. One explanation could be that the U.S. tends to pursue their interventions in a more direct way, thus not always looking for the United Nations as the primary organization of intervention. These claims are highly speculative of course and should provide further avenues for future research.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper pursues two main objectives. First, we wish to shed light on what determines interventions by the United Nations Security Council in general. Second, we analyze whether the geographical proximity to any of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council play any role in determining the probability of intervention. Given the United Nations’ goal “To

keep peace throughout the world,” the decision to intervene, both militarily (peacebuilding and peacekeeping) and by sanctions, should theoretically not be affected by geographical location. However, our results suggest that the larger the geographical distance to France or the United Kingdom, the lower the probability of UN intervention. Specifically, for every 1,000 kilometers of distance, the probability of intervention seems to decrease by 30 percent, everything else equal. Interestingly, we do not find any significant results for distances to the other three permanent members (China, Russia, and the United States). Thus, the traditional big European political powers appear to have a strong political influence in the UN’s decisions about conflict intervention.

In addition to our geographical results, we also find that the UN is significantly more likely to intervene in *(i)* less populated countries, *(ii)* the poorest nations, and *(iii)* countries, which are less open to international trade. We leave it up to the reader to draw any potential conclusions from these findings.

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**Table 1: Conflicts since 1945**

Country	Year	UN intervention	Country	Year	UN intervention
<b>Africa</b>			<b>Africa cont.</b>		
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1960		Senegal	1988	
Cameroon	1960		Comoros	1989	
Ethiopia	1960		Mali	1990	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1960	Yes	Algeria	1990	
Ethiopia	1961		Rwanda	1990	Yes
Sudan	1963		Ethiopia	1991	
Ethiopia	1964		Sierra Leone	1991	Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1964	Yes	Niger	1991	
Gabon	1964		Djibouti	1991	
Burundi	1965	Yes	Angola	1991	
Chad	1966	Yes	Eritrea	1993	
Nigeria	1966		Congo, Rep.	1993	
Ghana	1966		Niger	1994	
South Africa	1966		Niger	1995	
Zimbabwe	1966	Yes	Comoros	1997	
Cambodia	1967	Yes	Lesotho	1998	
Nigeria	1967		Congo, Dem. Rep.	1998	
Morocco	1971		Guinea-Bissau	1998	Yes
Uganda	1971		Guinea	2000	
Madagascar	1971		Central African Republic	2001	Yes
Sudan	1971	Yes	Cote d'Ivoire	2002	Yes
Ethiopia	1974		Nigeria	2003	
Ethiopia	1975		Nigeria	2004	
Mauritania	1975		Mauritania	2008	
Angola	1975	Yes	Sudan	2011	
Morocco	1975		Sudan	2011	Yes
Mozambique	1977		Libya	2011	Yes
Ethiopia	1977				
South Africa	1978				
Tunisia	1980		<b>Asia</b>		
Liberia	1980	Yes	Russian Federation	1945	
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1981		Iran, Islamic Rep.	1945	
Gambia, The	1981		Russian Federation	1946	
Kenya	1982		China	1946	
Somalia	1982	Yes	Philippines	1946	
Ethiopia	1982		Iran, Islamic Rep.	1946	
Togo	1986		China	1947	
Burkina Faso	1987		Myanmar	1948	
Senegal	1988		Myanmar	1948	
Comoros	1989		Myanmar	1948	
Mali	1990		Israel	1948	
Algeria	1990		Myanmar	1948	
Rwanda	1990	Yes	India	1948	
Ethiopia	1991		Myanmar	1949	
Sierra Leone	1991	Yes	China	1950	
Niger	1991		Indonesia	1950	
Djibouti	1991		Thailand	1951	
Angola	1991		Indonesia	1953	
Eritrea	1993		India	1955	
Congo, Rep.	1993		Vietnam	1955	
Niger	1994		Malaysia	1957	
Niger	1995		Myanmar	1957	
Comoros	1997		Oman	1957	
Lesotho	1998		Iraq	1958	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1998		Lebanon	1958	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	1998	Yes	Lao PDR	1959	
Guinea	2000		Myanmar	1959	

**Table 1 cont.** Conflicts since 1945

Country	Year	UN intervention	Country	Year	UN intervention
<b>Asia cont.</b>			<b>Europe</b>		
Nepal	1960	Yes	Greece	1946	
Iraq	1961		France	1961	
Malaysia	1963		Spain	1968	
Thailand	1965		United Kingdom	1970	
Indonesia	1965		Romania	1989	
India	1966		Georgia	1991	
Syrian Arab Republic	1966		Azerbaijan	1991	
Oman	1968		Georgia	1991	
Philippines	1970		Serbia	1991	Yes
Pakistan	1971		Moldova	1991	
Sri Lanka	1971		Serbia	1991	
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1972		Croatia	1992	Yes
Pakistan	1973		Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Yes
Myanmar	1973		Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Yes
Bangladesh	1975		Georgia	1992	
Indonesia	1975		Azerbaijan	1993	
Sri Lanka	1975		Bosnia and Herzegovina	1993	Yes
Afghanistan	1978	Yes	Serbia	1996	Yes
India	1979		Macedonia, FYR	2000	
Saudi Arabia	1979		<b>North America</b>		
India	1979				
Iran, Islamic Rep.	1979		Cuba	1953	
India	1981		Dominican Republic	1965	
India	1983		Haiti	1989	Yes
Turkey	1983		Panama	1989	
India	1984		Trinidad and Tobago	1990	
Israel	1986		Mexico	1994	
Turkey	1987		United States	2001	
India	1989		<b>Latin America</b>		
Indonesia	1989				
Russian Federation	1990		Bolivia	1946	
Russian Federation	1990		Paraguay	1947	
Pakistan	1990		Costa Rica	1948	
Tajikistan	1992		Guatemala	1949	
Tajikistan	1992		Argentina	1955	
Russian Federation	1993		Venezuela, RB	1962	
India	1993		Colombia	1964	
Yemen, Rep.	1994		Peru	1965	
Russian Federation	1994		Uruguay	1970	
Myanmar	1997		El Salvador	1972	
Russian Federation	1999		Chile	1973	
Uzbekistan	1999		Nicaragua	1974	
India	2004		Suriname	1986	
India	2005		<b>Oceania</b>		
Russian Federation	2007				
Myanmar	2009		Papua New Guinea	1989	

**Table 2:** Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	(Std. Dev.)	N	Source	Description
interv	0.15	(0.36)	178	UN	Dummy = 1 if economic sanctions or arms embargo, peacekeeping operations, and/or military intervention (peacebuilding); = 0 otherwise
intensity	0.51	(0.50)	178	UCDP	0 if between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths; 1 if at least 1,000 battle-related deaths
lnpop	16.57	(1.79)	151	PWT	ln(population); variable <i>POP</i>
lngdp	7.49	(1.07)	130	PWT	ln[PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres) at 2005 constant prices]; variable <i>rgdpl</i>
lnopen	3.65	(0.75)	130	PWT	ln(Openness at 2005 constant prices in %); variable <i>openk</i>
polityIV	-0.49	(6.45)	168	Polity IV	level of democracy, ranging from -10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (total democracy); variable <i>polity2</i>
ukdist	5.37	(2.70)	178	own	distance to the United Kingdom in thousand kilometers
fradist	4.84	(2.82)	178	own	distance to France in thousand kilometers
chidist	4.36	(4.03)	178	own	distance to China in thousand kilometers
rusdist	3.48	(2.87)	178	own	distance to Russia in thousand kilometers
usdist	8.02	(3.05)	178	own	distance to the United States in thousand kilometers
africa	0.37	(0.48)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in Africa
asia	0.41	(0.49)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in Asia
europa	0.11	(0.31)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in Europe
namerica	0.04	(0.19)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in North America
oceania	0.01	(0.07)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in Oceania
smamerica	0.07	(0.26)	178	own	Dummy = 1 if country in Latin America
landlocked	0.20	(0.40)	178		Dummy = 1 if country is landlocked
island	0.10	(0.30)	178		Dummy = 1 if country is an island

Notes: UCDP and PWT stand for Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Penn World Table Version 7.1, respectively. UN represents the UN Security Council resolutions.

**Table 3:** Comparing UN intervention cases to non-intervention cases and to worldwide averages

Variable	Interventions Mean (Std. Dev.) N	Non-interventions Mean (Std. Dev.) N	World Average 1960 – 2010 Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Intensity	0.70 (0.47) N = 27	0.48 (0.50) N = 151	
Population in thousands	7,262 (5,144) N = 25	101,407 (221,390) N = 126	22,849 (91,611) N = 11,284
GDP per capita	1,850 (2,519) N = 23	3,668 (5,101) N = 107	8,578 (11,097) N = 8,664
Trade Openness (% of GDP)	47.34 (32.97) N = 23	50.23 (37.88) N = 107	69.20 (46.89) N = 8,664
PolityIV	-3.73 (4.21) N = 22	-0.01 (6.59) N = 146	0.49 (7.49) N = 7,947
Distance from the UK in 1,000 km	4.37 (2.25) N = 27	5.55 (2.74) N = 151	5.46 2.77 N = 6,676
Distance from France in 1,000 km	3.65 (2.27) N = 27	5.05 (2.86) N = 151	4.95 (2.94) N = 6,676
Distance from China in 1,000 km	5.29 (2.74) N = 27	4.19 (4.20) N = 151	6.11 (4.33) N = 6,676
Distance from Russia in 1,000 km	3.55 (2.18) N = 27	3.46 (2.98) N = 151	4.47 (3.32) N = 6,676
Distance from the US in 1,000 km	8.02 (2.37) N = 27	8.02 (3.16) N = 151	7.15 (3.36) N = 6,676
Africa	0.63 (0.49) N = 27	0.32 (0.47) N = 151	0.29 (0.45) N = 11,727
Asia	0.11 (0.32) N = 27	0.46 (0.50) N = 151	0.24 (0.42) N = 11,727
Europe	0.22 (0.42) N = 27	0.09 (0.28) N = 151	0.23 (0.42) N = 11,727
North America	0.04 (0.19) N = 27	0.04 (0.20) N = 151	0.10 (0.30) N = 11,727
Oceania	0 (0.00) N = 27	0.01 (0.08) N = 151	0.05 (0.22) N = 11,727
Latin America	0 (0.00) N = 27	0.09 (0.28) N = 151	0.10 (0.30) N = 11,727

**Table 4:** Basic results and differences across continents. Displaying odds ratios

	(1) interv	(2) interv	(3) interv	(4) interv	(5) interv	(6) interv
africa	7.083* (7.529)	8.799** (9.493)	6.076 (6.723)	0.965 (1.324)	0.609 (0.874)	0.709 (1.056)
asia	0.857 (1.013)	0.793 (0.945)	1.391 (1.722)	0.698 (1.083)	0.701 (1.104)	0.487 (0.821)
europa	9.231* (10.50)	11.05** (12.82)	10.87** (13.01)	49.36*** (67.24)	24.93** (37.87)	16.10* (25.95)
intensity		3.951*** (1.927)	6.026*** (3.398)	5.141** (3.408)	2.655 (1.938)	7.388** (7.013)
lnpop			0.557*** (0.117)	0.351*** (0.110)	0.335*** (0.117)	0.289*** (0.125)
lngdp				0.280** (0.144)	0.258** (0.153)	0.366* (0.217)
lnopen				0.356** (0.173)	0.345** (0.172)	0.0981** (0.0954)
polityIV					0.948 (0.0623)	0.893 (0.0696)
landlocked					0.627 (0.477)	0.673 (0.508)
island					0.267 (0.378)	0.102 (0.181)
year						1.112** (0.0567)
<i>N</i>	178	178	151	130	125	125

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table 5:** Basic results, including the geographical distance from the United Kingdom. Displaying odds ratios

	(1) interv	(2) interv	(3) interv	(4) interv	(5) interv	(6) interv
ukdist	0.839** (0.0714)	0.821** (0.0705)	0.833* (0.0824)	0.638*** (0.101)	0.671** (0.121)	0.691* (0.140)
intensity		2.959** (1.366)	5.218*** (2.835)	4.696** (2.871)	2.937* (1.907)	6.641** (5.314)
lnpop			0.527*** (0.100)	0.342*** (0.0996)	0.357*** (0.109)	0.276*** (0.112)
lngdp				0.446** (0.142)	0.403** (0.179)	0.481 (0.216)
lnopen				0.329** (0.159)	0.325** (0.160)	0.0952*** (0.0842)
polityIV					0.973 (0.0566)	0.906 (0.0641)
landlocked					0.742 (0.562)	0.746 (0.566)
island					0.754 (1.087)	0.235 (0.426)
year						1.104** (0.0484)
<i>N</i>	178	178	151	130	125	125

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



**Table 6:** Basic results, including the geographical distance from France. Displaying odds ratios

	(1) interv	(2) interv	(3) interv	(4) interv	(5) interv	(6) interv
fradist	0.819** (0.0701)	0.799*** (0.0693)	0.822** (0.0808)	0.655*** (0.100)	0.692** (0.121)	0.711* (0.139)
intensity		3.058** (1.420)	5.275*** (2.869)	4.735** (2.883)	2.993* (1.937)	6.722** (5.335)
lnpop			0.527*** (0.101)	0.352*** (0.100)	0.367*** (0.110)	0.280*** (0.113)
lngdp				0.487** (0.150)	0.433* (0.188)	0.517 (0.226)
lnopen				0.332** (0.159)	0.332** (0.161)	0.0936*** (0.0833)
polityIV					0.975 (0.0563)	0.904 (0.0644)
landlocked					0.742 (0.560)	0.748 (0.565)
island					0.734 (1.081)	0.218 (0.401)
year						1.107** (0.0488)
<i>N</i>	178	178	151	130	125	125

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

**Table 7:** Basic results, including the geographical distance from China, Russia, and the US (distances in 1,000km). Displaying odds ratios

	(1) interv	(2) interv	(3) interv	(4) interv	(5) interv	(6) interv
intensity	2.705** (1.232)	5.569** (4.257)	2.605** (1.177)	5.250** (3.970)	2.611** (1.181)	5.920** (4.586)
chidist	1.073 (0.0532)	0.988 (0.113)				
rusdist			1.011 (0.0735)	0.859 (0.140)		
usdist					0.993 (0.0680)	0.882 (0.113)
lnpop		0.303*** (0.114)		0.279*** (0.107)		0.309*** (0.115)
lngdp		0.571 (0.244)		0.552 (0.234)		0.463 (0.229)
lnopen		0.122*** (0.0981)		0.121*** (0.0962)		0.123** (0.101)
polityIV		0.911 (0.0618)		0.911 (0.0624)		0.912 (0.0618)
landlocked		0.759 (0.571)		0.664 (0.499)		0.830 (0.622)
island		0.0757 (0.129)		0.0886 (0.154)		0.106 (0.174)
year		1.110** (0.0469)		1.104** (0.0459)		1.109** (0.0468)
<i>N</i>	178	125	178	125	178	125

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$